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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

vs.

:

HAROLD EUGENE HARMON,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

:

Case No. 20060027-CA

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a finding of guilty of Distributing a Controlled
Substance in a drug free zone, to-wit: methadone, a first-degree felony in
violation of U.C.A.§ 58-37-8. This court has jurisdiction over this appeal
pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-2A-3(2)G).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF
REVIEW
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN FAILING TO GRANT
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEA OF
GUILTY?
PRESERVATION: This issue was properly preserved for appeal by the
timely filing of a motion to withdraw his plea which was denied. (R. 090)
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The Court in the case of State v. Mora,
(2003 Ut App 117 If 16) has held: "The 'withdrawal of a plea of guilty is a
1

privilege, not a right. . . [and] is within the sound discretion of the trial court.'
State v. Gallegos, 738 P.2d 1040, 1041 (Utah 1987). Thus, 6[w]e review a trial
court's denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea under an abuse-ofdiscretion standard.' State v. Blair, 868 P.2d 802, 805 (Utah 1993)."
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
58-37-8. Prohibited acts — Penalties.
(1) Prohibited acts A — Penalties:
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to
knowingly and intentionally:
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to
produce, manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit substance;
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, consent,
offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance;
(iii) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to distribute;
or
(iv) engage in a continuing criminal enterprise where:
(A) the person participates, directs, or engages in conduct which results
in any violation of any provision of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b,
37c, or 37d that is a felony; and
(B) the violation is a part of a continuing series of two or more
violations of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d on separate
occasions that are undertaken in concert with five or more persons
with respect to whom the person occupies a position of organizer,
supervisor, or any other position of management.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a) with respect to:
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, a controlled substance
analog, or gammahydroxybutyric acid as listed in Schedule III is guilty
of a second-degree felony and upon a second or subsequent conviction is
guilty of a first-degree felony;
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or marijuana, is guilty of
a third degree felony, and upon a second or subsequent conviction is
guilty of a second degree felony; or

2

(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a
third degree felony.
(c) Any person who has been convicted of a violation of Subsection
(l)(a)(ii) or (iii) may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate
term as provided by law, but if the trier of fact finds a firearm as defined
in Section 76-10-501 was used, carried, or possessed on his person or in
his immediate possession during the commission or in furtherance of the
offense, the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted for a
term of one year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and the
court may additionally sentence the person convicted for an
indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not
concurrently.
(d) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a)(iv) is guilty of a
first degree felony punishable by imprisonment for an indeterminate
term of not less than seven years and which may be for life. Imposition
or execution of the sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not
eligible for probation.
(2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful:
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a
controlled substance analog or a controlled substance, unless it was
obtained under a valid prescription or order, directly from a practitioner
while acting in the course of his professional practice, or as otherwise
authorized by this chapter;
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any building,
room, tenement, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place knowingly and
intentionally to permit them to be occupied by persons unlawfully
possessing, using, or distributing controlled substances in any of those
locations; or
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an altered or
forged prescription or written order for a controlled substance.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect
to:
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, is guilty of a second
degree felony;
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, marijuana, if the amount is
more than 16 ounces, but less than 100 pounds, or a controlled
substance analog, is guilty of a third degree felony; or
3

(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form of an extracted resin
from any part of the plant, and the amount is more than one ounce but
less than 16 ounces, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
(c) Upon a person's conviction of a violation of this Subsection (2)
subsequent to a conviction under Subsection (l)(a), that person shall be
sentenced to a one-degree greater penalty than provided in this
Subsection (2).
(d) Any person who violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to all
other controlled substances not included in Subsection (2)(b)(i), (ii), or
(iii), including less than one ounce of marijuana, is guilty of a class B
misdemeanor. Upon a second conviction the person is guilty of a class
A misdemeanor, and upon a third or subsequent conviction the person is
guilty of a third degree felony.
(e) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) while inside
the exterior boundaries of property occupied by any correctional facility
as defined in Section 64-13-1 or any public jail or other place of
confinement shall be sentenced to a penalty one degree greater than
provided in Subsection (2)(b), and if the conviction is with respect to
controlled substances as listed in:
(i) Subsection (2)(b), the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for
an indeterminate term as provided by law, and:
(A) the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted to a
term of one year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and
(B) the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for an
indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run consecutively
and not concurrently; and
(ii) Subsection (2)(d), the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for
an indeterminate term as provided by law, and the court shall
additionally sentence the person convicted to a term of six months to
run consecutively and not concurrently.
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(ii) or (2)(a)(iii)
is:
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor;
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor; and
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a third degree felony.
(g) A person is subject to the penalties under Subsection (4)(c) who, in
an offense not amounting to a violation of Section 76-5-207:
(i) violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) by knowingly and intentionally having
in his body any measurable amount of a controlled substance; and
4

(ii) operates a motor vehicle as defined in Section 76-5-207 in a
negligent manner, causing serious bodily injury as defined in Section
76-1-601 or the death of another.
(3) Prohibited acts C - Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally:
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or distribution of a controlled
substance a license number which is fictitious, revoked, suspended, or
issued to another person or, for the purpose of obtaining a controlled
substance, to assume the title of, or represent himself to be, a
manufacturer, wholesaler, apothecary, physician, dentist, veterinarian,
or other authorized person;
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or attempt to procure
the administration of, to obtain a prescription for, to prescribe or
dispense to any person known to be attempting to acquire or obtain
possession of, or to procure the administration of any controlled
substance by misrepresentation or failure by the person to disclose his
receiving any controlled substance from another source, fraud, forgery,
deception, subterfuge, alteration of a prescription or written order for a
controlled substance, or the use of a false name or address;
(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or written order for a
controlled substance, or to utter the same, or to alter any prescription or
written order issued or written under the terms of this chapter; or
(iv) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, plate, stone, or other
thing designed to print, imprint, or reproduce the trademark, trade name,
or other identifying mark, imprint, or device of another or any likeness
of any of the foregoing upon any drug or container or labeling so as to
render any drug a counterfeit controlled substance.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3)(a) is guilty of a
third degree felony.
(4) Prohibited acts D — Penalties:
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not
authorized under this chapter who commits any act declared to be
unlawful under this section, Title 58, Chapter 37a, Utah Drug
Paraphernalia Act, or under Title 58, Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled
Substances Act, is upon conviction subject to the penalties and
classifications under this Subsection (4) if the trier of fact finds the act
is committed:
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary school or on the
grounds of any of those schools;
5

(ii) in a public or private vocational school or postsecondary institution
or on the grounds of any of those schools or institutions;
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other structure
or grounds which are, at the time of the act, being used for an activity
sponsored by or through a school or institution under Subsections
(4)(a)(i) and (ii);
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care facility;
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation center;
(vi) in or on the grounds of a house of worship as defined in Section
76-10-501;
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, arena, theater, movie
house, playhouse, or parking lot or structure adjacent thereto;
(viii) in a public parking lot or structure;
(ix) within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or grounds included in
Subsections (4)(a)(i) through (viii);
(x) in the immediate presence of a person younger than 18 years of age,
regardless of where the act occurs; or
(xi) for the purpose of facilitating, arranging, or causing the transport,
delivery, or distribution of a substance in violation of this section to an
inmate or on the grounds of any correctional facility as defined in
Section 76-8-311.3.
(b) A person convicted under this Subsection (4) is guilty of a firstdegree felony and shall be imprisoned for a term of not less than five
years if the penalty that would otherwise have been established but for
this subsection would have been a first-degree felony. Imposition or
execution of the sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not
eligible for probation.
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been established
would have been less than a first degree felony but for this Subsection
(4), a person convicted under Subsection (2)(g) or this Subsection (4) is
guilty of one degree more than the maximum penalty prescribed for
that offense.
(d) (i) If the violation is of Subsection (4)(a)(xi):
(A) the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for an
indeterminate term as provided by law, and the court shall
additionally sentence the person convicted for a term of one
year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and
(B) the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for
an indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run
consecutively and not concurrently; and
6

(ii) the penalties under this Subsection (4)(d) apply also to any person
who, acting with the mental state required for the commission of an
offense, directly or indirectly solicits, requests, commands, coerces,
encourages, or intentionally aids another person to commit a violation
of Subsection (4)(a)(xi).
(e) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this Subsection (4) that the
actor mistakenly believed the individual to be 18 years of age or older
at the time of the offense or was unaware of the individual's true age;
nor that the actor mistakenly believed that the location where the act
occurred was not as described in Subsection (4)(a) or was unaware that
the location where the act occurred was as described in Subsection
(4)(a).
(5) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is specified is a class
B misdemeanor.
(6) (a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section is in addition to,
and not in lieu of, any civil or administrative penalty or sanction authorized by
law.
(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal law or the law of
another state, conviction or acquittal under federal law or the law of
another state for the same act is a bar to prosecution in this state.
(7) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evidence or proof
which shows a person or persons produced, manufactured, possessed,
distributed, or dispensed a controlled substance or substances, is prima facie
evidence that the person or persons did so with knowledge of the character of
the substance or substances.
(8) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in good faith and in the
course of his professional practice only and not for humans, from prescribing,
dispensing, or administering controlled substances or from causing the
substances to be administered by an assistant or orderly under his direction and
supervision.
(9) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on:
(a) any person registered under the Controlled Substances Act who
manufactures, distributes, or possesses an imitation controlled
substance for use as a placebo or investigational new drug by a
registered practitioner in the ordinary course of professional practice or
research; or
(b) any law enforcement officer acting in the course and legitimate
scope of his employment.
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(10) If any provision of this chapter, or the application of any provision to
any person or circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder of this chapter shall
be given effect without the invalid provision or application.
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure;
Rule 11(e)
e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and
mentally ill, and may not accept the plea until the court has found:
(1) If the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has knowingly
waived the right to counsel and does not desire counsel;
(2) the plea is voluntarily made;
(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, the right
against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy public trial before
an impartial jury, the right to confront and cross-examine in open court the
prosecution witnesses, the right to compel the attendance of defense witnesses,
and that by entering the plea, these rights are waived;
(4) (A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to
which the plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the burden
of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the plea
is an admission of all those elements;
(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is sufficient if it
establishes that the charged crime was actually committed by the defendant or,
if the defendant refuses or is otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the
prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of conviction;
(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if
applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, that may
be imposed for each offense to which a plea is entered, including the possibility
of the imposition of consecutive sentences;
(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea
agreement, and if so, what agreement has been reached;
8

(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any motion to
withdraw the plea; and
(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited.
These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on the record or,
if used, a written statement reciting these factors after the court has established
that the defendant has read, understood, and acknowledged the contents of the
statement. If the defendant cannot understand the English language, it will be
sufficient that the statement has been read or translated to the defendant.
Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not required to
inquire into or advise concerning any collateral consequences of a plea.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Defendant was originally charged with the crimes of manslaughter
in violation of UCA §76-5-205, two counts of distribution of a controlled
substance in a drug free zone, in violation of UCA § 58-37-8, and possession of
drug paraphernalia a class A misdemeanor in violation of UCA §58-37a-5. A
preliminary hearing was held on May 17, 2005, and the trial court took the
manslaughter charge under advisement subject to memoranda from both sides.
On July 20, 2005, the court dismissed the manslaughter charge and bound the
Defendant over for trial on the remaining charges. Meanwhile, the Defendant
had also been charged in a separate information with the charge of possession
with intent to distribute a controlled substance on another occasion in violation
of UCA § 58-37-8. That charge was also a first-degree felony based on the fact
that it also was alleged to have occurred in a drug free zone and it was alleged
9

that the Defendant had prior convictions. The Defendant was also charged with
other lesser charges, which were ultimately dismissed as part of the plea
bargain.
On August 31, 2005, the Defendant changed his plea pursuant to a plea
negotiation in which the Defendant pled guilty to the first degree felony
distribution charge and the prosecution dropped the drug free zone language on
the second first-degree felony possession with the intent to distribute charge,
making that a second degree felony to which the Defendant pled guilty.
On September 7, 2005, the Defendant filed a pro se motion to withdraw
his plea. (R. 090) A hearing on that motion was held on September 14, 2005.
At that hearing the Defendant elected to withdraw his motion with respect to
the second degree felony case, but wanted to go forward on the motion to
withdraw his plea on the first degree felony charge. A hearing was set for
October 5, 2005, on that motion, at which time the court instructed both sides
to prepare memoranda on the issue.
On November 9, 2005, the court denied the Defendant's motion to
withdraw his guilty plea based on the statement in advance of guilty plea
signed by the Defendant and based on the plea colloquy in open court prior to
the taking of the guilty plea.
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The Defendant

was sentenced on December

12, 2005, to an

indeterminate term in the Utah State Prison of not less than five years that may
be for life. (R. 117)
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On August 3, 2004, the police went to the house of the Defendant to
investigate the death of Mr. Gordon. He had died earlier in the evening of
August 3 ld . The officers talked to the Defendant, and after reading him his
Miranda rights questioned him about the death. (R. 146/23) The Defendant
said that Mr. Gordon had repeatedly asked him for some methadone to calm
him down and then admitted giving Mr. Gordon some of his methadone
"because he was in such a state I couldn't turn him down". (R. 146/ 23) The
Defendant admitted that he had observed Mr. Gordon smoke speed and some
cocaine on Sunday night, August 1, 2004. (R. 146 / 23) Testimony of Detective
Reeves confirmed that the death occurred within 1000 feet of a drug free zone.
(R. 146/45)
Further investigation revealed that the Defendant had received the
methadone from a clinic in Bountiful, and that on January 22, 2004, the
Defendant had signed a form in which he acknowledged that he had been given
a booklet that had information regarding the use of his methadone prescription.
The booklet instructs the user not to share the methadone with anyone since
11

they may not have built up a tolerance to the drug. It also related that the use
of methadone alone or in conjunction with other drugs could "create a life
threatening hazard." (R. 146 / 29, 26)
On August 4, 2004, Dr. Frikke of the Utah State Medical Examiners
office conducted an autopsy on Mr. Gordon and determined that he had died of
drug poisoning from a combination of methamphetamine, methadone, and
cocaine. (R. 1 4 6 / 7 ) Dr. Frikke opined that it was possible that the single
dosage of methadone may have been capable of causing death; but that it was
the combination of the drugs that most certainly caused the death of Mr.
Gordon. (R. 146 / 12-14) Dr. Frikke also discovered that Mr. Gordon did not
have a prescription for any of the above listed drugs. (R. 146/14)
In a separate information the Defendant was charged with the crime of
possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute. On August 31,
2005, the Defendant pled guilty pursuant to a plea negotiation to one firstdegree felony distribution of a controlled substance in a drug free zone (in
conjunction with the Mr. Gordon case) and to one amended count of
distribution of a controlled substance, a second-degree felony in the other case.
On September 9, 2005, the Defendant filed a motion to withdraw his
plea on the first-degree felony charge (electing to accept the second-degree
felony plea taken at the same time), and a hearing was held on November 9,
12

2005. At that hearing the Defendant told the court that the reason for his
motion to withdraw his guilty plea was "ineffective assistance and diligence."
(R. 149/3) The Defendant told the court " Well, he, you know, he - we were
going to trial on the, you know, on the other thing - and he never even
mentioned these - going to trial on this other stuff, know what I mean, and I
told him I wanted to go to trial on it. I said Fm not guilty, you know." (R. 149 /
3) The court explained to the Defendant that a motion to withdraw a plea
would be granted based only on what was said in open court and what was
contained in the plea statement. The court explained to the Defendant that it
recalled asking him if he had had enough time to talk to his attorney. (The
court had in fact asked, "Have you had enough time to talk to [your attorney]
about this plea? to which the Defendant said yes. And " do you need any more
time." to which the Defendant said a no." (R. 145 /10)) The court also noted
that the Defendant had signed a statement in advance of a guilty plea in open
court. (Addendum B)
The trial court then asked for additional grounds to which the Defendant
replied, "I just didn't feel like I was, you know, justly represented." (R. 149/4)
The court inquired why the Defendant had said "no" when asked if he needed
more time to talk to his attorney, and the Defendant stated, "Because I was
scared, to be totally honest with you. I mean I was, your honor, I really was."
13

(R. 149/4) The Defendant told the court, " I guess like what he tells you back
[in the holding cell adjacent to the courtroom] ... is totally different than what
he says to you, I mean, how can I, you know, I don't know -I don't know
where I'm supposed to come up with the right words for you." (R. 149/5)
The trial court denied the motion to withdraw the guilty plea based on
the statement in advance of guilty plea signed by the Defendant and based on
the plea colloquy in open court. (R. 149/7)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The determinative issue of the Defendant on appeal is whether the trial
court improperly denied the Defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
Based upon the Rule 11 colloquy conducted at the plea hearing, and based
upon the fact that the defendant executed and acknowledged reading and
understanding the statement in support of guilty plea document, the trial court
properly followed the requirements of Rule 11.
After having reviewed the case law together with all these factors,
defense counsel has been unable to find any non-frivolous issues to appeal.
For this reason, this brief is being filed in accordance with the guidelines set
forth in Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and State v. Clayton, 639
P.2d (Utah 1981).

14

ARGUMENT
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure; Rule 11(e) provides a guideline that
a trial court must follow in the taking of a plea of guilty. The application of this
Rule has been held by the Supreme Court of the State of Utah to require strict
compliance. In the case of State v. Ostler, 996 P.2d 1065, 1068 (Ut. Ct. App.
2000) the Court held:
"Rule 11(e) squarely places on trial courts the burden of ensuring
that constitutional and Rule 11(e) requirements are complied with
when a guilty plea is entered." State v. Benvenuto, 983 P.2d 556,
558 (quoting State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1312 (Utah 1987)).
The trial court must strictly adhere to Rule 11(e). See State v.
Thurman, 911 P.2d 371, 372 (Utah 1996). (emphasis added)
This "strict compliance" requirement replaced the former "substantial
compliance" requirement before a plea can be taken. (See State v. Thurman,
911 P.2d 371, 372 (Utah 1996) where the Court held, "Gibbons created a 'strict
compliance' rule requiring that a trial court 'personally establish... that the
defendant... understood the elements of the crime'".)
The Rule 11 colloquy utilized during the taking of a plea of guilty must
establish this "strict compliance" for each element of the plea. Although the
extent of this strict compliance requirement has been recently reviewed by the
Utah Supreme Court in the cases of State v. Dean, 95 P.3d 276 (Utah 2004)
and State v. Corwell, 114 P.3d 569 (Utah 2005), the requirement of the court
taking a plea of guilty remains one of strict compliance.
15

In determining

whether each of these Rule 11 requirements were appropriately adhered to in
the case at bar it is necessary to review each element in conjunction with the
trial court's efforts at compliance.
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 11(e) provides " The court may
refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill, and may
not accept the plea until the court has found:
(1) If the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has
knowingly waived the right to counsel and does not desire
counsel;
(2) the plea is voluntarily made;
(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of
innocence, the right against compulsory self-incrimination, the
right to a speedy public trial before an impartial jury, the right to
confront and cross-examine in open court the prosecution
witnesses, the right to compel the attendance of defense witnesses,
and that by entering the plea, these rights are waived;
(4) (A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the
offense to which the plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution
would have the burden of proving each of those elements beyond
a reasonable doubt, and that the plea is an admission of all those
elements;
(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is
sufficient if it establishes that the charged crime was actually
committed by the defendant or, if the defendant refuses or is
otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the prosecution has
sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of conviction;
(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence,
and if applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of the minimum
sentence, that may be imposed for each offense to which a plea is
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entered, including the possibility of the imposition of consecutive
sentences;
(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and
plea agreement, and if so, what agreement has been reached;
(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing
any motion to withdraw the plea; and
(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is
limited.
These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant
on the record or, if used, a written statement reciting these factors
after the court has established that the defendant has read,
understood, and acknowledged the contents of the statement. If the
defendant cannot understand the English language, it will be
sufficient that the statement has been read or translated to the
defendant.
Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not
required to inquire into or advise concerning any collateral
consequences of a plea, (emphasis added)
In the case at bar the Defendant read and executed a statement in support
of a guilty plea, (see Addendum B) That document clearly addressed each of
the above elements of Rule 11 in great detail. The trial court asked the
defendant if he had read the statement in advance of guilty plea to which the
defendant said, "yes sir" (R. 145 / 9). The trial court described to the
Defendant what he was pleading guilty to and the Defendant stated that he
thought he was pleading to two-second degree felonies. The court told the
Defendant that the proposal was to a second and a first, and asked "[Do] you
17

understand the difference?", to which the Defendant replied, " Yes, sir. Quite a
bit different." (R. 145 9) The trial court then asked the Defendant, "No one's
putting any pressure on you to enter this plea today?" To which the Defendant
answered, "no, sir." (R. 145/9) The Defendant acknowledged that he had had
enough time to talk to his attorney and didn't need any more time to talk to his
attorney. (R. 145/10)
The trial court and defense counsel then described the elements of the
offense and the factual basis for the plea as follows:
On August [2] 2004, you did knowingly and intentionally
distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance or you agreed,
consented, offered, or arranged to distribute a controlled or
counterfeit substance, to wit: methadone. And the offense was
committed in a public parking lot structure or within a thousand
feet of any structure.. .The defendant shared his methadone with
Cheyenne Gordon. It eventually caused Mr. Gordon's death.
(R. 145/8)
The trial court also went through the possible maximum sentence that
could be imposed (R. 145 / 7). The trial court incorporated the statement in
support of guilty plea into the record. (R. 145/9)
At a hearing on the Defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea, the
trial court found that all Rule 11 requirements had been met, that the Defendant
knew and understood his rights at the time of the plea, and that the Defendant
had knowingly and voluntarily entered his guilty pleas.
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The only issue the Defendant wanted appealed, and under the
circumstances the only issue the Defendant could appeal, was the voluntariness
of the entry of his guilty plea. Since all the Rule 11 requirements were
followed, and since the Defendant admitted in the hearing on his motion to
withdraw his plea that he understood his rights, there are no possible violations
on which to appeal.

For these reasons, counsel respectfully requests

permission to withdraw from further representation of the Defendant.
The only claim that the Defendant makes regarding a knowing and
intelligent entry of plea is a claim as follows:
The trial court then asked for additional grounds to which the
defendant replied, "I just didn't feel like I was, you know, justly
represented." (R. 149/4) The court inquired why the defendant
had said no when asked if he needed more time to talk to his
attorney, and the defendant stated, "Because I was scared, to be
totally honest with you. I mean I was, your honor, I really was."
(R. 149/4) The defendant told the court, " I guess like what he
tells you back [in the holding cell adjacent to the courtroom] ... is
totally different than what he says to you, I mean how can I, you
know, I don't know -I don't know where I'm supposed to come
up with the right words for you." (R. 149/5)
The Defendant does not claim that he was under the influence of any
kind of drug or alcohol nor does he claim that he was not of a right mind.
On February 22, 2006, appellant's attorney sent a letter to the appellant
regarding the intention to file an Anders brief and requesting a response. (A
copy of which is attached as Addendum B) On March 3, 2006, the appellant
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sent a letter in response to that letter in essence claiming that he believed that
he had an absolute right to withdraw his plea at any time before sentencing.
He also claimed that he believed he had ineffective assistance of counsel on the
basis that trial counsel told him that everything would be taken care of in his
appeal. (A copy of that letter is attached as Addendum C) The appellant
raised no new issues in Addendum C that had not previously been mentioned
in previous letters requests.
CONCLUSION
Counsel is unable to find any non-frivolous issues to appeal. For this
reason, counsel respectfully requests this Court to release him as appellate
counsel.
DATED this /I'day of Marcl/2006.

^NDALL W. RI(
ttorney for Appellknt
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that I mailed two copies of the Joxegoing BriefptAppellant to
Mark Shurtleff, Attorney General, Attorney for the)Plaintiff/160 E ^ t 300
South, 6th Floor PO Box 140854 SLC, Utah 84 M4-0180/postage
this tf[day of March, 2006.

©AllV/BllCHARDS
attorney at Law

20

ADDENDUM A

21

SECOND DISTRICT COURT - OGDEN COURT
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
APP SENTENCING
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs .

Case No: 051901670 FS

HAROLD EUGENE HARMON,
Defendant

Judge:
Date:

LOn
ERNIE W JONES
tC j 4
December 14, 2005

PRESENT
Clerk:
dianew
Reporter: OLSEN, DEAN
Prosecutor: BRENDA J. BEATON
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): RYAN BUSHELL (PDA)
Agency: Adult Probation and Parole
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: January 22, 1950
Video
CHARGES
DISTRIBUTE/OFFER/ARRANGE TO DIST C/S - 1st Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 09/01/2005 Guilty
HEARING
This is before the Court for sentencing. Defendant
present in custody from the Weber County Jail. Court
finds no legal basis why sentence should not be imposed.

Case No: 051901670
Date:
Dec 14, 2005
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of DISTRIBUTE/OFFER/ARRANGE TO
DIST C/S a 1st Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an
indeterminate term of not less than five years and which may be
life in the Utah State Prison.
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately.
To the WEBER County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the
defendant will be confined.
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
Prison term imposed to run consecutively to prison term imposed in
case 051904133 FS.
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THE PUBLIC DEFENDER ASSOCIATION, INC.
OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
APPELLATE DIVISION
2550 Washington Boulevard, Suite 300
Randall W Richards

Dee W Smith

Ogden, Utah 84401

Telephone: (801)399-4191
February 22, 2006

Harold Eugene Harmon
Inmate #21598
Housing U-3-401-B
Utah State Prison
P. O. Box 250
Draper, UT 84020
Re: SOU v. Harold Eugene Harmon
Dear Mr. Harmon,
I have been working on your appeal, and have done extensive research regarding your
complaint that the Judge should have granted your motion to withdraw your guilty plea. I have
not been able to fmd any cases to support our position on this issue. The problem is that where
you told the judge at the plea hearing that you had read the plea bargain agreement and fully
understood it, the Judge had no legal reason to allow your plea to be withdrawn. The fact that
you may have had a question about Mr. Gravis being ineffective or not diligent, but gave no
reason for that allegation, does not rise to the level required to withdraw a plea which would be
that you did not knowingly enter the plea.
The Utah Appellate Courts will not change a judge's decision on this issue unless it is so
obvious that you did not know the rights you were giving up when you entered the plea.
I am filing a brief saying that I can find no issue for an appeal. I have enclosed a copy of
that brief for your inspection. If you have any other issues you would like discussed on
appeal, please bring them to my attention within 30 days of the date of this letter. If I do
not hear from you on further issues, I will submit the brief to the Court of Appeals unchanged.

Attorney at Law
RWR/mm
Enclosure
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